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PIETY, MACINTYRE, AND KIERKEGAARDIAN
CHOICE: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BALLARD
John Davenport

This paper concerns a debate between two previous articles in Faith and
Philosophy. In 1995, Bruce Ballard criticized Marilyn Piety's argument that the
Kierkegaardian "choice" between the 'aesthetic' and 'ethical' modes of existence is not an irrational or criterionless leap. Instead, Ballard defended
MacIntyre's view that Kierkegaard's position succumbs to the tensions inherited from its opposing enlightenment sources. I argue in response that Ballard
sets up a false dilemma for Kierkegaard and misunderstands Kierkegaardian
pathos. To bolster Piety's position, I compare her analysis to my own argument (developed in an earlier paper) that the "choice" to determine oneself in
light of ethical distinctions has to do with the personal appropriation, not the
authority, of morality. I also compare this to arguments from several other
scholars that the choice in Either/Or has to do with taking responsibility for and
developing one's 'self,' not with providing a foundation for moral norms.
Finally, in light of these analyses, I argue against Ballard's remaining socialist
criticism that Kierkegaard's ethics is "bourgeois."

1. Introduction

In her 1993 paper, "Kierkegaard on Rationality," Marilyn G. Piety
argues that in After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre misinterpreted
Kierkegaard when he said that for Kierkegaard, "the transition from an
aesthetic to an ethical view of existence" can only be made by an arbitrary or "criterionless choice."l Piety's view is hardly uncommon: for
several years now, Kierkegaard scholars have almost unanimously
rejected MacIntyre's irrationalist reading of Kierkegaard as a grave misinterpretation. 2 But apparently many in the wider philosophical community still remain unconvinced. In his recent response to Piety in this
journaV Bruce W. Ballard argues that Kierkegaard's Either-Or exhibits
conflicting tendencies towards overcoming the aesthetic stage either by
a Hegelian "objective refutation" or by the alleged decisionism of a "passionate choice."4 In response, I will compare Piety's analysis to my own
previously published argument against MacIntyre's contention, which
Ballard repeats, that "Kierkegaard's ethical stage has no authority but
the passion of the individual choosing it."s Once the fallacy in this contention is understood, it will be easy to dispatch the remaining errors in
Ballard's argument against Piety.
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Tl. Ballard's Dilemma for Piety

Against MacIntyre, Piety maintains that in the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, Kierkegaard portrays despair brought about by persistent or
deep misfortune as facilitating the transition from the "aesthetic" to the
"ethical" stage of human life: since the ethical framework explains suffering tragically, i.e. as "essential" to temporal existence, the aesthete
who despairs of living in immediacy discovers that the ethical framework may have first-personal significance for his own experience. 6 But
Ballard, following MacIntyre's Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, objects
that there is a "blank inconsistency" in Kierkegaard's desire both to give
an "objective refutation" of the aesthetic sphere by showing that it "fails
by its own criteria" and yet to leave the decision to "passionate choice,"?
which Ballard identifies with the affects of romanticism: "Hegelian
dialectic and the romanticism of feeling do not combine for a coherent
theory of choice.'"
There are several problems with this alleged dilemma, both as a dismissal of Kierkegaard's endeavor and as a response to Piety's interpretation. First, Ballard interprets Kierkegaard's emphasis on the problem of
suffering and exposure to the whims of fortune as a Hegelian dialectical
move: "Kierkegaard is clearly trying to exhibit contradiction internal to
the aesthetic point of view ... "" But, while Kierkegaard's progress from
immediacy to the ethical and on to the religious does parallel part of
Hegel's dialectic,lO the suffering towards which Piety points is not a simple contradiction in aesthetic life that would compel one into the ethical
sphere. The necessity with which Hegel endows his transitions of spirit
is missing in the passage between Kierkegaard's existential stages, since
they allow for freedom. Moreover, as we will see, the despair through
which the aesthete begins to take account of the ethical is not the completed choice to leave aesthetic existence, but only the practical condition of possibility for this choice. As Alastair Hannay says in his
remarks on Either/Or, the point of setting up a pseudonymous "confrontation of the two views of life" is precisely to provoke "something
like a direct or intuited realization of the preferability of the ethical from
a direct comparison of the two views," without appeal to external
authority.11 But the choice is not criterion less, as Hannay says, because it
is to be made by people starting within the aesthetic. Kierkegaard's aim is
to raise the levels of consciousness of such people sufficiently for
them to see the point of actually calling their preferences aesthetic,
and thereby enable them to see that there could be an alternativeY
And once the alternative is made explicit or self-conscious, a number of
considerations will reveal the rightness of the ethical, though again
without forcing its election. 13 In particular, buttressing Piety's point,
Hannay notes that the aesthete's attempt to live in "the succession of
moments" generates a sense of dependence on fate outside his control
that "leads easily to despair." 14 This critique of the aesthetic is more similar to Socrates's argument in the Republic that the tyrant's soul cannot

354

Faith and Philosophy

achieve happiness than to an inexorable Hegelian Aufhebung.
Having misinterpreted this aspect of Kierkegaard's position as an
attempted demonstration that the ethical must supersede the aesthetic
with Hegelian necessity, Ballard completes his false dilemma by misreading the other horn -"passionate choice" - as mere sublime "feeling." In
this, he ignores Piety's argument that for Kierkegaard, "passion" or
pathos is neither mere emotion nor disinterested reflection, since it
involves a rationality that is "not reducible ... to reflection" in the speculative sense. l ' Rather, there is a kind of "rational assessment of phenomena" which is interested because it involves "subjective engagement" or
has the self as jts object, but is nevertheless not capricious like a mere
affective reaction. 16 I would describe the same point by saying that
Kierkegaard preserves a place for volition in its classical 'middle-soul'
sense: like emotion and unlike abstract speculation, the practical deliberation Piety describes is first-personally motivating, but unlike impulses
and brute preferences, it has intentional content, cognitive significance,
and is reasons-responsive. The motivation generated in such practical
deliberation is "subjective" in the first-personal but not the non-cognitive
sense. In particular, Piety believes that such 'volitional passion,' as we
might call it, is connected with our essential interest in "determining or
choosing the proper interpretation of existence;" hence, in "impassioned
or subjective judgment" the aesthete can be motivated to enter the ethical
framework by the improbability of persistent suffering on the aesthetic
account of life. l?
Against this central point, the only objection Ballard offers is that "the
proper degree of passion cannot be specified."l' Here again, however,
the idea that the will is either guided by a purely "theoretical grasp of my
ultimate end" or else it is not "rationally guided" at all and anything
goes,'Y presents the same false dilemma in another guise. As Gordon
Marino put it in another valuable analysis of MacIntyre's critique, saying
that "we always have a choice" is not to say that "we always have a coin
to toss." In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre himself acknowledges that there is "something between chance and demonstration."2I)
And as Anthony Rudd has explained in a recent study, Kierkegaard
gives good reasons in his analysis of skepticism for concluding that the
will "to commit oneself to what is dubitable" is already involved in all
"substantive knowledge,"21 and this includes knowledge of ethical precepts. Contrary to MacIntyre's portrait of Kierkegaard as an enlightenment thinker who accepts the need to demonstrate the authority of moral
contrasts and principles without presupposition, Kierkegaard never held
that morality can be justified to the amoralist from a neutral, "disengaged" stance: rather, the interestedness of the will affects how we interpret the conditions of human fulfillment, which in turn prescribe in what
ways we should be interested. This circle is not vicious, but it cannot be
escaped through some Archimedean skeptic-defeating insight into the
ethical. As Rudd says against MacIntyre, however, the Judge is "constantly arguing" for the ethical, not simply "giving portraits of the ethical
life," and his arguments are powerful just "because they are concerned
with what' A' - or anyone else - is interested in attaining: happiness,
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well-being, eudaimonia."22 Similarly, Marino argues that "Kierkegaard's
concept of choice presupposes a universal but not universally recognized
need to be whole."n Or as Piety puts it, "Kierkegaard maintains that we
have an essential interest in determining or choosing the proper interpretation of existence"2' which makes self-unity possible. In short, the
Judge's arguments appeal to the situated, existing will that conditions the
aesthete's interpretation of fulfillment, though without determining it to
choose the ethical-and this is just what Piety found in her analysis of the
Postscript as well.

III. A Comparison of My Defense of Kierkegaard to Piety's
In my 1995 paper on "The Meaning of Kierkegaard's Choice Between
the Aesthetic and the Ethical," independently of Piety,2" I gave different
arguments for the same conclusion that MacIntyre is wrong in construing Kierkegaard as an irrationalist and in analyzing the "primordial
choice" to be an agent who chooses in ethical consciousness as free only
in an arbitrary sense. Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's argument that the
most distinctive feature of persons is their capacity to form what he calls
higher-order volitions by which persons "identify" with some of their
possible motives for acting while alienating others (whereas agents who
act on desires without such higher-order volitions are "wanton"), I
argued that the "primordial choice" which Judge William describes in
Either/Or Vol. II can be interpreted as the choice between remaining
"wanton" or taking responsibility for one's "self" through higher-order
volitions.'" Therefore the primordial choice to become a chooser-in-theethical-sense (chooser,) does not generate the authority of ethical principles for the individual, as MacIntyre assumes, but rather gives the distinction between good and evil personal relevance and application within the individual's life -for only "inner character" or dispositions of the
higher-order will can have moral virtue, rectitude, or their opposites. 27
Thus when a person makes choices in the higher-order will, identifying
with some possible action-guiding intentions rather than others in light
of their varying values, she is choosing "in the ethical sense" for
Kierkegaard, and her volitional identifications will have moral worth or
unworth. But the objective authority of her conscience -the cognitive
aspect of her values and standards of moral worth- does not derive
from her original choice to form her self through higher-order volitions.
Thus I compared the position of a conscious or awakened aesthete, who
finally faces this choice, to that of someone who knows the traffic laws
but has not yet driven: her decision to get behind the wheel involves her
personally in this practice for the first time, and will lead to her acquiring
a "driving character" (e.g. reckless, overcautious, defensive, etc .. ) but it
hardly creates the authority she recognizes in the traffic code or the
virtues of a good driver. 28 Similarly, the Judge's point in Either/Or II is
that the aesthete should engage in the practice of selfhood -or higherorder volition- through which she will acknowledge her self and
acquire status on the scale of moral worth.
If this reading is right, it constitutes a decisive refutation of the claim
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that "Kierkegaard's ethical stage has no authority but the passion of the
individual choosing it."29 This analysis fills out Marino's point that, in
Either/Or, "Kierkegaard thought he was writing about choice in fundamental connection with the formation of the self and the purification of
the will," rather than "aspiring to produce a basis for morals" in the
wake of Kant's failure. In the face of this fact, MacIntyre's account
appears to be either a willful misconstrual or a wholly unjustified suggestion that Kierkegaard had unconscious, ulterior motives.)(l
Similarly, the close relation between Kierkegaardian passion and volitional identification shows what is wrong in Ballard's view that it is
incoherent to make "the choice for the ethical a purely subjective and
passionate one while the concept of ethics is abstract and universal."31
For the primordial choice to be a chooser c , or "to live seriously as
opposed to indifferently,"J2 as Marino puts it, is made by identifying
with some set of values or "ground projects" (whether good or evil) that
give first-personal significance to norms and precepts: their universal
form therefore does not imply that they need be "impersonal" or external to the agent's motivating concerns. 33 The force of these arguments
against incautious charges of irrationalism will be all the greater if my
analysis and Piety's are mutually reinforcing, as I believe they are.
Although we adopt apparently quite different strategies in defending
Kierkegaard from such charges, there is an underlying convergence
between our interpretations, which I will outline in five items.
First, higher-order volitions are rational passions in Piety's sense: "the
'earnestness' and 'pathos' characteristic of good or evil choice do not signify mere intensity of emotion ...but rather that the choice unequivocally
associates the inward self with the content chosen."34 Similarly, although
he initially analyzed a "second-order volition" simply as a desire that is
about another desire -a desire to be guided or moved in one's bodily
actions by one first-order desire (A) rather than another (B)"- Frankfurt
later modified this analysis in recognition that to identify with desire A
rather than B must involve more than merely having another desire to act
on A.3b The higher-order volition is not merely a further desire or brute
preference, but rather an attitude that essentially includes a non-arbitrary evaluation, which itself involves "deciding what to think."37
Identification is a process of personally engaging the whole self through a
kind of reasoning, namely an "interested" or non-detached practical reasoning: in other words, higher-order volition is "will" in the classical
middle-soul sense, constituting a type of motivation between engaged
appetite and disengaged intellect. Unlike the wanton, the person who
engages in volitional identification is "participating in conflicts within
himself between second-order volitions and first-order desires ... "3b This
notion clarifies what Piety is trying to indicate with the Polanyian idea
that "passion" signifies a direct "personal participation" of the agent, as
opposed to "disinterested" reflection on our options. 39 Since this capacity for higher-order volition is arguably identical to the "spirit" in which
alone we develop our "self" for Kierkegaard/o it also becomes clearer
why "passion is the very essence of human existence," as Piety says.41
This is true precisely because "passion" for Kierkegaard is first-personal
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identification in something like Frankfurt's sense; it is the volitional
capacity which makes us persons.
Second, after distinguishing the "primordial choice" to engage in
volitional identification from the recognition of ethical distinctions as
authoritative, I argued that when the aesthete in Either/Or J[ faces the
choice between the aesthetic and the ethical explicitly, she is conscious
of a primordial responsibility to choose the ethicalY Her choice is thus
not reasonless or unmotivated, and as a result she can no longer remain
in the neutral immediacy of the aesthetic: if she tries to return to it, she
instead enters sinful defiance (denying the ethical responsibility of which
she is nevertheless aware).43 Marino concurs: "if you are really facing
the choice, you have already chosen to choose;" you can refuse the ethical in defiance, but cannot return to the aesthetic, since the aesthetic is
the stage in which "earnest choice" that recognizes one's selfhood (or
capacity for volitional identification) is lacking. 44 Therefore the aesthete
can remain in her stage of existence only by a kind of tacit refusal to face
the choice implied by her sel£hood, a state of "bad faith."4s This substantially agrees with Piety's point that for Kierkegaard,
even the least reflective individual can only avoid recognizing the
tenuous nature of happiness on the aesthetic view of existence by
willfully refusing to reflect upon the significance of this view. 46
Third, I also argue that the process by which the primordial choice
between the aesthetic and ethical spheres of existence becomes salient
for the agent -or is "forced" in James's sense- is a complex one in
which both the individual's experience and willingness to face the insufficiency of the aesthetic playa roleY Piety's argument that suffering or
misfortune may force the issue on Kierkegaard's view explains part of
this process by which an individual is elicited out of immediacy and
brought to face the question of how to determine her third or highestorder will, i.e. the will either to form second-order volitions and thus to
acquire an inner character (whether good or evil), or to resist forming
such volitions and (vainly) try to live in the immediate ebb and flow of
first-order desires and preferences. 4R
Fourth, Piety's thesis that the passion of suffering gives significance to
"extra-framework criteria or reasons for choosing" between the aesthetic
and ethical frameworks helps fill in a gap left by my earlier analysis.
While I asserted that the person facing the primordial choice does not
choose arbitrarily because he already discovers a primordial responsibility to choose ethical choice (or to form a higher-order volitional character), I did not try to explain the phenomenal source of its objective
authority. Piety's view that Kierkegaard's individual has an inherent
desire for an interpretive scheme that makes sense of her subjective
experience and explains the basis on which her happiness depends/ 9
which she compares to Taylor's "need for meaning,"50 suggests an
intriguing way of answering this question. This is not to deny Marino's
concession that Kierkegaard does not fully face the questions raised by
"moral diversity" or differences of ideals, nor does he emphasize rea-
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son's role in deriving or grounding specific moral precepts.51 But it goes
too far to claim that duty has no rational basis, or that "for Kierkegaard,
the force of our oughts in no way rests upon the answers to our whys."52
For as I have suggested, Kierkegaard's focus on the "internal" as
opposed to the "external" should be read as asserting the decisive
importance of the higher-order will in determining our moral worth:
this does not imply that our outward acts and their consequences are
irrelevant, nor that there is no role for casuistry. 53
Fifth and finally, like Piety, I argued in my article that the freedom
involved in passionate choice for Kierkegaard is a kind of "liberty" since the outcome is not determined by its antecedents and alternate
possible outcomes are accessible to the agent- but not an indifferent liberty in which the individual neutrally or randomly picks between options.
Instead, Kierkegaard holds that the range of available choices and the
apparent value of different options to the individual is always conditioned by the character she already is, i.e., by both her outward habits of
bodily action and her inward dispositions of the higher-order will. Since
actualized choices shape these features of character which condition the
availability and salience of options in future choices, no choice in this
existential model is ever just "arbitrarily reversible."" And because the
person naturally begins with an aesthetic character, including a tacit
highest-order will (in bad faith) not to make choices informed by ethical
distinctions, even the primordial choice of the highest-order will is not
indifferent. 55 Piety concurs, noting that arbitrary choice is impossible on
Kierkegaard's account, because
Kierkegaard believes that we inherit an aesthetic interpretation of
existence simply by being human and that we will never adopt any
other perspective without a specific reason for doing so; and such a
reason cannot arise, on his view, unless we take an interested
stance toward the phenomena of our subjective experience. 56
Hence "For Kierkegaard, there is no sitting on the fence between selves,"
as Marino says.57
In sum, my account and Piety's converge on five basic points about
ethical authority, free choice, and the structure of personhood -in
Either/Or and the Postscript, respectively. Together our analyses provide
a deeper defense of a view summarized by Timothy Jackson, which may
represent an emerging consensus among Kierkegaard scholars today:
Ethical and religious questions call for passionate choice, but the
choice is not arbitrary. Kierkegaard is a realist with regard to
ethico-religious truth and a fallibilist with regard to ethico-religious
justification; his introduction of volition and emotion into the equation ... does not spell the loss of objective norms for right behavior."
Thus it is particularly imperative that we not make MacIntyre's error
of ascribing the value-relativism and absolute liberty of Sartre's Being
and Nothingness to Kierkegaard: as Jackson says, there is "the widest pos-
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sible intellectual distance between Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity and the arbitrary individualism of Nietzsche and Sartre."S9
The natural next step in the approach Piety and I have taken is to
argue against the still widely held view that Kierkegaard is a theological
voluntarist in the sense of holding that "God is not bound by even the
highest moral rule" and therefore that the knight of faith "may be called
upon to violate generally valid moral rules."no Against this familiar
reading, I have argued that the sense in which Abraham "suspends the
ethical" in Fear and Trembling has nothing to do with adding to humanly
communicable ethical standards a new "requirement of obedience to
God's particular commands."bl Rather, on my reading, the famous "teleological suspension" refers to the expectation ("absurd" by every human
standard of possibility) of an eschatologically possible reprieve in the realm
of temporal finitude, a miraculous turn which fulfills the ethical and
even restores the individual to ethical validity.62 The personal relation to
eschatological divinity which such faith involves certainly transcends
communicable ethical relations, but it incorporates and goes beyond them
by realizing the eternal ethical ideal in the actuality of time, rather than
violating the ethical."3 If this reading can be extended to other pseudonymous works concerned with religious categories, it will show that the
"leap" from the ethical to religious spheres of existence is no more arbitrary or misologist than the choice by which the aesthete first relates herself to her selfhood and enters the ethical sphere. A4 So much for Ballard's
MacIntyrian equation of Kierkegaard's divine Absolute with "the
Blakean concept of God as Nobodaddy."65 This analysis also shows that
Kierkegaardian faith is hardly a "revised form of Pascal's wager" as
Ballard saysn": for the designation "absurd" means precisely that eschatological possibility is incalculable, not that faith is prudentially rational.

IV. Ballard's Remaining Socialist Objections
Against this background, the rest of Ballard's objections, which are
made directly against Kierkegaard rather than towards Piety, can be
dealt with in quick succession. First, Ballard argues, amazingly, that
"Kierkegaard's paradigm of the ethical stage is the life of a self-satisfied
bourgeois."6l For those who would have thought that this better
described the aesthetic stage, Ballard's evidence for this claim is that
"Kierkegaard's ethical is virtually apolitica1," individualistic, and lacking in "any clear notion or concern for justice ... "6R Living on his own
inheritance, he thinks money is irrelevant, and to the poor he offers only
an unforgiving puritanical work ethic. Moreover, by ignoring the social
structures in which work is embedded, "Kierkegaard ends up making a
virtue of alienated labor."n'!
In response to this quasi-Marxist critique, we must openly acknowledge that Kierkegaard did not devote himself to casuistry, i.e., deriving
rational precepts of natural justice (though he acknowledges that such
principles exist), nor did he develop an account of justified political
authority on their basis. This was not his task: Kierkegaard was not
Aquinas, much less Rawls. But this difference in focus hardly suffices to
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make his ethical outlook "bourgeois." His emphasis on many different
forms of charity in Works of Love alone is sufficient to disarm this charge.
As the Hangs write in their introduction to this book:
... there is ... also a social otherness in the emphasis on love of
neighbour. This is not an ethic of socia-political structures but an
ethic of social-structures-at-hand, whatever the larger socia-political structures might be. Those who say that Kierkegaard had no
consciousness of anything but a purely private individualistic ethic
cannot digest this work, nor, when properly understood, his other
ethical works, but least of all this.70
Kierkegaard does not, pace Ballard, conceive the ethical as a purely
individual determination in isolation from social relations: as Anthony
Rudd has emphasized, "For Kierkegaard, morality is a product of commitment to roles and relationships."71 Rudd describes this feature of
"engagement" which the aesthete avoids as "long-term commitment;"n I
have analyzed it similarly in terms of volitional identification. But
although such identification is a free decision of the individual, Rudd is
right that it is precisely identification with a social self/3 i.e., with dispositions, motives, and ends that constitute the "character" who we become
in the social world -the character expressed in our actions and intelligible to others as the object of interpersonal interpretation. We identify
with being a character that locates us in social space as an agent with
commitments or cares based on shared understandings of what is
important or worthy of being cared about. This point is implicitly conceded in Ballard's own objection that "Kierkegaard would have us see
every job as a calling," although Ballard misreads this as validating
alienated labor. 74 As Rudd notes, the Kierkegaardian agent living in the
ethical mode "chooses to accept social roles" rather than merely occupying them: for example, through ethical participation in eternity, Judge
William incorporates his social roles as citizen, judge, father, and husband into the continuity of his life. 7s The point is not that workers
should passively consent to exploitation, but that our work should
express what we care about, that we should be able to engage ourselves
in our jobs, or embed them in our "self" through identification. And
interestingly, this is similar to what Marx meant in his critique of wage
labor and his ideal of non-alienated labor.7" Since there are limitations on
the kinds of work with which an ethical agent could identify, it is more
plausible to read Kierkegaard's doctrine as diametrically opposed to the
alienating labor processes of capitalism that divorce work from human
identity and demand a purely instrumental conception of careers.
Finally, Ballard does not offer convincing evidence that Kierkegaard's
"paradoxical religious stage" is anti-congregational and ignores the
problem of expressing Christian faith "in wider social and political culture."?7 The attack on "Christendom" is not a rejection of genuine
Christian community, but a critique, as David Gouwens says, of a
"Bourgeois Christianity" in which everyone is regarded as "Christian"
by default, a culture that "succeeds in making spiritlessness and worldli-
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ness that mark of spirituality." Instead, Kierkegaard develops implications of an "inwardness" that leads to "an appreciation of how faith is
manifest in works and hence also in the public sphere."7" Thus Ballard's
summary of Kierkegaard's ethico-religious life as "hard work regardless
of pay, a vaguely church-going religion and the domestic idyll"7Y is both
inaccurate and unfair.
In closing, let me acknowledge that the general picture which Ballard
offers of Kierkegaard's ethical ideal -namely, solipsistic pietism
reached by an arbitrary leap- is a picture that has been widely disseminated and often repeated. But Kierkegaard scholars have been refuting
it for several decades now, and thus many of the points I make in
response to Ballard are not new. It is unfortunate that this false picture
of Kierkegaard's position continues to exert a strong influence, since its
time as a defensible interpretation is clearly past, and it can now safely
be consigned to the annals of famous misunderstandings. sll
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